

HARVARD

#1

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First LECTURE 8/26/83 (Harvard)

I'm glad to see everybody here. I have a cold, I should say, so it's just as well that everybody's fairly well away from me. (INTRODUCTIONS)

Nick Browning -- psychiatrist (private)

Steve Zeigler (?) -- clinical psychologist (private)
(interviewing families re nuclear war)

Paula Zeitman -- free-lance writer, interviewing families
re nuclear war, 2 small children

John Reusser -- social worker, family therapist, involved
in interviewing project

Martha Pyle -- administrative aide?

Paul Mataliana -- works for Committee on Health Care, State
Legislature

Robert Ellsberg -- theology (?) student

Duria Donnelly -- student/teacher

Peggy Shriner -- teacher at Wellesley (medieval history)

_____ -- playwright

Dorothy Austin -- research associate

John Magnum (?) --

Margaret Brim Gibson -- clinical professor, Dept. Psychiatry

Becky Ramsey -- Intern in child psychiatry

I had a feeling -- I don't know whether you expect to be an irregularly scheduled thing -- lecture; I do know that some people will be coming on other occasions who aren't here tonight, so I'll make in particular the weeks and even the individual lectures

somewhat self-contained. I'm having some papers copied that I'll pass out tomorrow that might be relevant later. I'm going to use this lecture really to get kind of an overall _____ subjects I'll be dealing with in the course of the year, but also it's kind of a preface to personally ... I hope that this course, and I'm encouraged by the backgrounds and the motivations of the people who are represented here tonight, encouraged to think they will really get some answers. Possibly some very tentative answers, or new slants on questions that I have been walking around looking at for a long time in my life. I think I can define to some extent both the subject matter and the slant and experience that I will bring to these things by relating these questions to the incidents in my own history and in our shared history that put these questions in my mind tonight. And that'll introduce _____ which may be worthwhile.

Last July, a young woman I know was walking through forests and villages in Czechoslovakia and Poland on a peace march toward Moscow. She was of Russian parents; she describes them as being very Russian, peasant people on the whole, but she'd never been to Russia, or to East Europe. I'd met her a year earlier, when we'd been arrested together, in fact, twice, sitting in at the Livermore Nuclear Weapons Design Laboratory near Berkeley, where I live, which designs, along with Los Alamos, all of the American nuclear weapons that have ever been designed, from Hiroshima to the neutron bomb. This is quite a change for her, because she was, at the time that I met her a year ago, a deputy sherriff in San

Francisco. So we were booked in together, hand-cuffed, fingerprinted, put in cells, by policemen who were her colleagues. It was quite an abrupt change in her life. She remained a deputy sheriff, at that point, and was a deputy sheriff the second time she was arrested at Livermore. She was arrested later at Vandenberg, interfering with preparations for an MX launch, in a civil disobedience action this spring, and she heard of two events from somebody who was in jail with her, actually in the improvised jail at Vandenberg. One was this peace walk to Moscow, which she felt, with her Russian background, was right for her, that's what she wanted to do -- demonstrate for peace in Russia. The other was a fast for life some people were going to start on August 6. How many people have hear of this? It's an open-ended water fast that had been announced a year earlier, that is announced last year at the UN special assembly, calling for some action in the fall of 83 that would stop the momentum of the arms race. That too struck her as something that was very significant to her, and she decided she would do a support fast wherever she was on August 6. Many people did this, thousands of people fasted either on the 6th, or on the 6th through the 9th, I fasted for nine days starting on the 6th, and thousands of people, in fact, fasted around the world for some part of the time. So she decided she would do a fast. As she walked through East Europe, and met people for the first time, they had interpreters with them, each night they stopped in a village and talked to the people, she told me that in late July, as she looked at the country, as she put it, "that my President regards as dispensible, I decided I would


join the open-ended fast." On August 6, by a fairly amazing coincidence, the group reached Auschwitz, in Poland. And so she started her fast in Auschwitz. In the course of the day she was touring the camp, and was shown, apparently all visitors are, a pool that had been a lime pit, into which ashes had been thrown, and then it was filled with water. And she was asked with the others to put her hands in the water. And she did, and she brought up ash and bits of human bone (this was an early part of the trip to Auschwitz). The distinguishable pieces of human bone in her hands, forty years old, at Auschwitz, made her dissolve. She said, "I dissolved." And she said to herself, "Never again." And started her fast.

She was telling me on about the 35th day of this water fast. She'd decided to keep going. She did end on the 44th day -- I just spoke to her a few hours ago, she's still in Bonn -- having in fact made a very significant impression on Willy Brandt, and gotten some _____ actions (we can come to that later if you want). But there's a number of aspects of that incident in my mind that do define themes that I'll be coming to. Above all -- well, I'll start with the point of her perception that the President had found these countries expendable. That's not an obvious reaction to the state of those countries, perception of them. I think she could have been influenced by something she heard me say -- or perhaps not. She had read various pieces that I'll give you tomorrow for later reading. As a matter of fact, how many hear have not read, say, "Call to Mutiny," an

introduction that I wrote? Has anybody read it? Okay, most of you have not. I'll give you that in the next couple of days. In any case, when I heard her say that, after she'd been fasting some thirty days or so, I certainly knew what she was talking about. When I was 29, I was working on the war plans of the United States for President Eisenhower. Mainly my work was with Command and Control of nuclear weapons, the possibility that weapons might be used accidentally, unauthorized action, and how to assure that the weapons would get used when the President wanted them used. But I particularly investigated the question, ~~of~~ might they be used when the President did not want them used, the kind of problem later suggested by films like Dr. Strangelove, Fail-Safe, and the recent War Games. The subject matter of those films was my professional subject matter twenty years ago. And by the way I see those films essentially as documentaries of what could happen; I've used them as such. They're not in any way unrealistic. In the course of that, I worked with -- began to be familiar with actual war plans, the plans that would have to be carried out if the President gave an execution order. Now, another point of contact with Andrea's experience in East Europe, of course, was the resonance of the name and the place, Auschwitz. I'd grown up, a little boy in the 30s, I was born in 1931 (I'm 52 now); so I was ten when the war started, fourteen when it ended, and during those four years got a very extensive education in the newsreels, not unlike the one that people get on TV in the

afternoons, these days with reruns of World War II, of what it meant to be a German, and what Germans did. I remember in particular being very horrified at the thought that we were forced to have fire drills in school, in which we were trained to throw buckets of sand on incendiary bombs that might be exploded on us, and we were shown models of these little bombs that the Germans had dropped on London. And I remember the name of them, they were magnesium thermite bombs, with the character that they would burn through skin and could not be put out by water. You shouldn't put water on them, you had to douse them with sand because the water would just spread the fire around. The idea that human ingenuity had produced a device that would make fires that you couldn't put out with water seemed particularly devilish, and sort of defined the Germans^{for me.} After the war, of course, we heard about Auschwitz, and that seemed to confirm the impression that what we had been fighting in World War II was uniquely evil and justified any degree of force used against it. At least that was the message that we were given pretty much. The message, in other words, was that we were witnessing a kind of behavior that was questionably human, certainly alien to us, deserving of total destruction, devastation -- a way of being, at least, that needed to be extricated from the world, and conceivably, embodied in people who could never be trusted -- a peculiar, a specific danger. That image made it hard for Americans to learn from what the Germans had done in World War II, just as a generation of 14-year-

olds hearing about the Korean air liner, may find it hard to learn from the President's language that they're witnessing something that could possibly have lessons for our air defense system or our reactions. Once again we're hearing the emphasis put on, as Les ^{celb}Gill put it, "the fact that Russian leaders are different from anybody else." That's an exact quote from the New York Times. There is a question whether it is possible to conduct a dialogue or negotiation with such people. The emphasis again and again is that they have departed from standards of civilization. The word barbarism is used continuously in connection with this massacre. The idea, then -- there is a question, after this incident whether the enemy, in this case, is a member of -- whether it's human or not, but in any case a real question of whether he's a member of a "civilized society" cast off aspects of civilization. As I say, these are not people you learn from, by example, they're people you prepare to fight. It's very closely related to what the pope said the other day: "We seem to be entering a pre-war mood instead of a post-war move." It's a definition of an adversarian term that are fighting terms, essentially, not terms for talking. How do you talk with a sub-human and barbaric culture that does not share our values? As I say, I can recognize that kind of characterization very well. It's not limited to Russians in the world today. The paper in the Boston Herald on Saturday, there's an article on "Lebanon: A New Vietnam," by Don Fetter,



and the major drift of this seemed very compatible to me at first, that we should not be involved in Lebanon; he didn't actually say we should get out, but he shows great regret about our being there. I was sympathetic with it, and then too I was sympathetic with: "The best," he says, "that can be hoped for is a stalemate." It's very regrettable; it seemed realistic. And then he says, "the real tragedy is that none of this had to happen. Last June the Israeli army drove to the gates of Beirut. It smashed PLO forces, killing 2000 guerrillas and capturing an additional 5000. More than 6000 PLO gunmen were cornered like rats in West Beirut. Syria's army was crushed after the Israeli air force destroyed its Soviet toys. Ariel Sharon, then Israeli Defense Minister, ached to send his soldiers into the western sector of the city to mop up PLO and Moslem guerrillas." This is, of course, the Sharon, you recall who is awaiting a return to the Cabinet now, a year later, on the anniversary of the Sabra and Sherif massacre, when he did send Phalangists in to mop up, not guerrillas, but, it turned out to be, civilians. As I've suggested already, to speak of other people as rats, or, again, "Israel was ready, willing, and able to clean out the vipers' nest," is a kind of fighting words, and I think they'd go along with the following sentence: "Stopping Israel from exterminating the terrorists [and we know that "terrorist" is a word used by the Israelis officially for Palestinians] and their allies was about the dumbest thing we could have done, but then we sent Marines as well, and now it's a no-win situation. If we advance, we could be sucked

into another Vietnam. If we withdraw our forces, America loses face and the Gemayel government falls. Its a heads they win, tails we lose situation. It's a wise man who lets others do his fighting for him [a new definition of wisdom]; regretablely, American foreign policy is guided by fools." So apparently, the lesson that he drew from last year's operation in Lebanon -- possibly the lesson that Begin drew -- is the same lesson that some people drew from Vietnam. Some. That a mistake was made, a tragic error, leading to many deaths, American and Vietnamese. The error was a failure to exterminate as many of the rats and vipers as was available to us. That was the mistake. The lesson we should learn is, stay out of such situations unless you're willing to be as exterminative as you're able to. As I say, that language somehow sounded familiar to me, because I happen to have with me, by chance, a clipping from Time, which I actually wanted for a different purpose, a different part of the page (I'll come to that next session). But it has on it this heading, it's from March 19, 1945, Time Magazine. The heading is, "Rodent Exterminators." "Three weeks of battle as bitter as any the world has known has raged on Iwo Jima, drenching its black ash beaches, ravines, and cliffs in blood." This what I was reading when I was fourteen. "The Japanese garrison is being squeezed into an ever-smaller band around the northern shore, but it was fighting with D-Day savagery. It's commander," I notice that I circled all the "its", in here, there's no "they," no "them," no human~~relation~~, "There seemed to be no end to the caves into which the Japanese had scurried, and each of the larger caves had many openings, inter-

connected underground." And it goes on, they paint((?) it out with flamethrowers, napalm, bit by bit, cleaned out these pockets, and the last sentence says, "As this week began, it was time for formal announcement, that the Pacific's nastiest exterminating job was done."

That was about as familiar language to me as I grew up, in terms of the Japs, as darkie jokes were in, say, Marx Brothers movies of that period. One has changed, basically, but the other is coming back -- the designation of the enemy in terms like these. And the word extermination is coming back. E.P. Thompson speaks of a tendency toward exterminism in the major industrial civilizations, industrial societies right now. He says, it's misleading to suggest, to say that Russia and the United States have military-industrial complexes. Rather, they are military-industrial complexes, and he identifies, tries to identify those tendencies in society that lead it toward, on the path, on what he calls a "path of extermination," and suggests there doesn't exist an adequate word for this, so he suggests the word "exterminism," for a social formation with the same conceptual nature as, say, imperialism. A tendency in our modern society.

As I say, I learned, personally, then, to define, however, this kind of phenomenon as alien behavior done by alien people, although, you know, in the back of my mind there was indications that it was also done to alien people in the Pacific. I remember

being at Harvard in 1954, waiting to go into the Marine Corps, having been deferred. I was teaching a student who was, in fact, older than I was, he was a German emigré, and he had been, in fact, in the German army at fifteen, at the end of the war. So he had been in air defense. Actually, he wasn't much older, he was about a year older than I. But he'd been in Germany during this time. He told me, of course, about the bombs on Germany, which I knew about by that time, but he described it to some extent. We used a lot of thermite on Germany, needless to say, and on Japan, in retaliation. At that time, we were talking about what was going on in Algeria, and there was a lot of discussion already of the use of torture by French troops in Algeria. I was criticizing this at one of the sessions, I forget what the occasion was, and he said, "Torture is just what you do to guerrillas. You Americans aren't familiar with that because you haven't fought guerrillas, as we did in the Second World War." And I said, "I don't think that's true. I don't think Americans do torture, or would torture. I think it came easier to the Germans." And he came to my office, then, unannounced a couple of days later, outside, he was supposed to come once a week -- he was a very arrogant guy, fairly rich, I think; we had a very distant relationship -- and on this one occasion, he got very personal. And he said, "I've come back because I've been talking about nothing else but what you've said at the dinner table at Harvard, with my friends, who

are mostly European. You know, I have to say I think there is something in what you said. I think there is something German about it, and this is very troubling to me, and I have to think more about it, but I want you to know that you've really made me think about this. _____." So I said, fine. It was very clear to me that I was not going to be part of an army that did any torture. But ~~in the Marines~~, later, I went to Vietnam.

In between, as I say, I worked on the war plans of the United States, and became aware of two aspects of it, that were not widely known on the outside. One was that the nuclear war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were, in fact, designed or written to be used in the event of any conflict with Soviet troops anywhere in the world. That meant that they assumed that we would initiate nuclear war, if we found ourselves fighting any significant number of Soviet troops enough to define the situation as "armed conflict," as opposed to, say, a mere skirmish of platoons or patrols in the _____ quarter. There was a disagreement among the military as to whether "armed conflict" meant two battalions, or perhaps two regiments, but there was agreement that a division or two would definitely involve armed conflict, and that would trigger what came to be known at the end of the fifties as the SIOP (Single Integrative Operational Plan) -- basically the strategic air command war plan, along with Polaris (?), which was coming in. This

plan called for hitting every city in Russia and China, since we then believed in a Sino-Soviet bloc, although by 1960-61, that was no longer realistic, but there was an inertia in our perceptions of that. And so, if we had been fighting Russians under any circumstances, no matter how it began -- Iran, Cuba, Berlin, anywhere -- once armed conflict was identified, we would implement this plan. The premise of the plan, then, was not that any nuclear weapons were being used against us, or in fact that any action had been taken against the continental United States. The premise was the U.S. troops had started fighting with Soviet troops. So the plan was, on its face, in most circumstances, a first-strike plan. First-strike not out of the blue, the concept was not that we would under any circumstances initiate hostilities with this plan, or any other -- we weren't going to initiate hostilities. /, supposedly. But, if hostilities did start, involving Russians, we would initiate nuclear operations, thermonuclear operations at that point. That has been the nature of our NATO planning since before there was a NATO, since 49-50, when we began to have plans for the "defense of Europe," to initiate nuclear war, and on an all-out basis involving Russia. I was trying to change and make those plans more flexible. This was the single plan for hitting, for engaging with Russians in combat under any circumstances. The reason there was only one, essentially, was budgetary, but Eisenhower wanted to preclude the navy and the army from coming and asking for enough divisions

to fight Russians with without using nuclear weapons. Eisenhower did not believe in limited nuclear war, either. He and _____ Kistiakowsky, who just recently died of cancer, who had worked on the atomic bomb, the Manhattan Project, and was the President's science adviser at the end of the fifties, has a diary which is quite revealing about his conversations with Eisenhower during this period. As I say, I knew that Eisenhower had devised this plan. I was perhaps the only civilian who knew this, by the way. The Secretary of Defense had never seen this plan. No civilian, officially, had ever seen the plan. Eisenhower as President and as a former general had been briefed on the plan. But on this one occasion he sent _____ down to look at some of the aspects of this plan. Here's a comment of Kistiakowsky's on a briefing from the President on limited war. He said, "My own impression was that the conclusions were as follows: if the other side is obliging enough not to do anything inconvenient to us, we will achieve our objectives, that is, containment and restoration of the status quo by conventional forces. Otherwise, we have to start using nuclear weapons. If the other side refrains from retaliating in kind, we still can achieve our objective. If they respond," and this was in 1960 -- the Soviets had 700, as I recall, SS-4s and 5s, these were intermediate range rockets, which are being phased out now in favor of the SS-20. They have 1 megaton warheads. 1 megaton is 50 Nagasaki bombs in explosive power. It's a million tons of TNT. Nagasaki was 20,000 tons.

A megaton weapon, then, on each of these warheads, has this implication: Harold Brown has figured out how many megaton warheads would be needed to destroy all life in the open in various countries of Europe, he has a table of this, so you can look up your country, and figure it out. Some are rather small, like Luxembourg, you know, one or two; and some are rather difficult, like Norway, it's so long and skinny, with a lot of mountains, so it takes quite a few. Germany takes 160 1-megaton warheads. Well, they had 700 1-megaton warheads on their intermediate range rockets at that time. So, we go back to the notion, "we have to start using nuclear weapons. If the other side refrains from retaliating in kind, we can still achieve our objectives. If they respond, nothing can be estimated about the outcome and we must be prepared to engage in all-out nuclear war. In every case, this scenario supposed we would use nuclear weapons only after some initial period, and only in limited quantities, for instance in air-to-air battle and against strictly tactical targets. Lengthy discussion followed with the President saying that he thought the whole thing was very unrealistic, and that we were unfortunately so committed to nuclear weapons, that the only practical move would be to start using them from the beginning, without any distinction between them and conventional weapons, and also, assuming there was direct Russian involvement, not an all-out strike on the Soviet Union --"

Q: What year is this, Dan?

A: 1960. "This remark made rather pointless the things I was going to say, so I kept still." Because K was against first use. This was Eisenhower. Well, Eisenhower left us, then, this plan, which, in fact, he supported his views. I might say, this is very interesting for me to read, because I always asked myself whether Eisenhower knew, had any knowledge of what the nature of these plans were. I'd heard he'd been briefed on them. But did he really comprehend what he had here? And what he had was a Doomsday Machine for Russia, at least. For the Northern Hemisphere, essentially. And if the missile gap were what it was ^{assumed} ~~seen~~ to be, in 60-61, in fact this was October of 60. This was when Kennedy was running on the issue of the missile gap, that the Soviets had more missiles than we had, and we had 200 warheads, according to them at that time. It seemed there was a missile gap that for us to do this all-out war was essentially then to blow up the Northern Hemisphere. Under all circumstances of fighting Russian troops. Notice his logic. If you are going to fight them at all, nuclear weapons will be used. If they're going to be used, you might as well use them first, and big, all the way. So he obviously clearly endorsed this plan, it reflected his own thinking, and there was no use spending money on divisions that would be meaningless once the war got started, because it would eventually go nuclear anyway, so you might as well save the money on that _____ inflation until the war. I thought

that was an inappropriate plan to have, so the idea was to encourage them to develop other ways of fighting Russians, if that should ever arise, than blowing up the Northern Hemisphere. I drafted a question for President Kennedy to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among other questions, a lot of questions, actually, and one of these questions was this: How many people would die in Russia and China if your plans were carried out as planned, that is, in other words, with a full force getting off the ground, not following an enemy attack, but with the full force of our programmed force. My assumption was that they didn't know the answer, because I'd been around these plans for a long time and around the planners more than, as I say, any other civilian, and I'd never heard any indication -- I'd ask people -- that they'd calculated how many civilians, or people in general would die. They'd made calculations of how many targets would be destroyed, how many cities would be destroyed, that's the way they operated, but not of the number of people in those cities that I had seen. So I thought they would have two choices, they either could say, they would give us an answer which, to be safe, would be certainly low, and we could say, come on, as they learned to do later. I remember in the Vietnam war you would ask how many civilian casualties there would be when you'd hit the target, and they would give calculations -- "Two. Four. Zero." So I thought there would be something like that -- this was five years earlier. Or, they would

have to say that they didn't know the answer. And then we could say, "What? You don't even know what you're going to do with this plan?" Which I thought was reality. "Well, then, we must look into this. Maybe we need a new plan. Maybe it's not the best plan we could possibly have when we look at what it actually does." And it would put them off balance bureaucratically, embarrass them, and we could press our new plan on them. But actually, they had an answer. / right away Other questions they did not answer, in fact they never answered questions that were sent under McNamara's name, and some of the Presidents' names. They did not ever answer, they were a little too painful. But this one, they did. They sent back a computer readout showing their calculation of how many people would die the first month, the second month, up to about six months, from the immediate effects of fallout. And, what do you think the figure was? Somebody who has not heard the answer from me. What do you think?

guesses: 6500. 1500. ??

Well, that's a pretty good range. No, the number was 325 million. But that was for Russia and China alone. Because I thought they didn't have any answers, so I wanted to show that they didn't even have -- I didn't want them to say, well, we haven't calculated for Czechoslovakia yet. I wanted to show that they didn't even know for Russia. So I'd asked them only Russia and China. Now I had to ask them the others. The others ~~were-in-~~ included some of the countries Andrea had been walking through. And some she

hadn't walked through. Wiped-out Finland. Wiped out by fallout from attacks on Leningrad, even though no warheads might land on Finland. Austria -- the same. Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Japan, neutral countries, Japan a virtual ally, the others neutral, on the borders, annihilated by our attack on the Soviet Union, without any warheads actually falling on their countries. Then there was a Russian retaliation against Germany, NATO with their 700 SS-4s and 5s. Not much retaliation, it turned out against the U.S., if we struck first, but some. The total casualty list, death list that I was looking at was not less than 600 million. Then a very resonant figure, because that's a hundred Holocausts. This was the calculated result of using the current operational war plan, which was to say a plan designed for the use of forces in existence, trained, deployed, equipped to carry out that plan at this moment. It's what the Joint Chiefs calculated would happen as the result of their efforts, on the President's orders, if war should occur the next day or the next week. It wasn't, in other words, an ~~unintended~~ engineered result. It was a sought, intended effect of activities that involved tens, hundreds of thousands, millions of Americans, designing bombs at Livermore, building them at Rocky Flats, deploying them, civilians, engineers, family men, and my friends, the planners. It had not occurred to me that the people I drank beer with and went out with in the evening and lunch in the Pentagon cafeteria every day with, knew what would

happen if their daily handiwork was put into operation. That they were participating in a plan, under some circumstances, to exterminate 600 million people. That is a realization that I have been walking around (END OF TAPE) (side 1)

By the end of 61, I had learned one further thing. As I say, ~~the~~ my assumption early in 61, when I was looking at these plans, was that whatever they said on their face, they were essentially retaliatory plans. And my shock at the amount of retaliation then reflected a reaction to the thought that humans, Americans, friends of mine, colleagues, ~~though~~ were cooperating in a plan consciously to do this, in retaliation, even in retaliation. I assumed that the first strike aspects of the plan were just wishful thinking in the military sense, since the Soviets were understood, by me with my top secret clearance, to have far more rockets than we had, many of whose locations we did not know, and therefore that we could attack them only at the cost of suicide. And that wasn't a real possibility. In July of 1961, the President actually made a speech in which he talked about the possibility of nuclear war before the end of that year over Berlin, in which the plan I've described would be triggered, if it were necessary to defend Berlin. The Russians had some 7 armored divisions in the vicinity of Berlin. So if we attempted to keep open our own way to Berlin there was no question we would get above the patrol skirmish very quickly, and the plan did call for initiating nuclear war if

necessary. And it was understood it would be necessary if the Russians didn't back down. Which they did. But Kennedy, before they had backed down, said, in a speech to the American public, that they should have fallout shelters by the end of the year. How many people here remember that? Could I ask, what do you remember of that?

A: Mainly what I remember is a lot of to-do -- I remember the appearance of the yellow signs that said where bomb shelters were. I remember getting instructions in school in how to get there, I remember people talking about whether they should build them in their back yards and so forth ...

A: And put machine guns in them.

DE: Do you remember that?

A: Absolutely.

DE: How old were you then?

A: I was fourteen years old.

DE: How did you relate to that discussion.

A: It was a dilemma, of not knowing what was the right thing to do.

DE: Does anybody else remember that machine gun discussion?

A: I do. And furthermore, I wasn't horrified. I was about 10 and they built one in my elementary school, and our teachers told us to ask our parents for Christmas to build one at our houses as well.

DE: For Christmas. And did your parents do that?

A: No, and that's why I felt very ill-used.

DE: Deprived. I would think so. Well, of course, they were in the front lines with you, I mean they didn't have one for themselves that they didn't let you into. Did they? or did you suspect anything like that?

Q: I think this is really an interesting point, because I do think, for instance, my wife remembers this real clearly also, about having that exact discussion and being very pissed-off at her parents for not shelling out the bucks to put a fallout shelter in the backyard, and they had a very straightforward discussion about if war comes, we want to all be together, which is something I don't think happens now.

DE: They didn't build a shelter, so the idea was, we want to go together.

Q: That's exactly what my parents said. They don't want to hang around in the basement if there's a war. They want to be killed. And at ten, I couldn't identify with that. I would much rather be in the basement.

DE: Any others?

A: I remember looking at fallout shelters -- there was one near my house -- and just thinking, this is not going to work. And I knew it was supposed to work, and I'd look at it, and I'd look underground, and say, I could see if a bomb fell it would just go right on this thing, and ~~thinking~~- feeling like, don't grown-ups know about this?

DE: You didn't understand the fallout point.

A: No. But it wasn't secure in any way. It was just a ridiculous place with a yellow sign on it.

DE: How many people here do not remember that? Some of you may not have been alive. Well, in that year, the U.S., as I just said, had 200 warheads in range of the Soviet Union on ballistic missiles -- intermediate range missiles, based in Europe the way the Pershing is supposed to be based, ICBMs, Atlas and ~~Thor~~ Jupiter, in this country, and three ~~submarine~~ Polaris submarines. The Soviets had 192 bombers in range of the United States; we had 3000 bombers in range of Russia. 3000 to 192. The fear was that that was equalized, however, by their excess over our 200 warheads of missile warheads. What they had actually in 61 was four warheads on ICBMs, as a matter of fact I just read in Fred Kaplan, did anybody see the Fred Kaplan piece in the Boston Globe the other day -- who saw that? Well, he had a point there that I don't remember seeing before which is very plausible, that the four ICBMs SS-6s did not have warheads on top of them, they had to put them on and take many hours to fuel them. That's probably true; I've never seen it. But he got the figure four, I know, initially from me. I revealed this some time ago. It's now declassified by other people. I should say, it's now exposed by other people, now that I've said it. I ~~thought~~ felt it was not too early, somehow, to be telling -- in fact, I first said it here in Boston, at the start of the mobilization for survival

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in 77. I thought it was about time the American people what the missile gap turned out to be. Now, you'll see in most books to this day that what the Soviets had was about 50. That's a bigger difference from the reality than may appear at first. We had 26 major SAC bases in the United States, so 50 would be approximately two per base for reliability, which was a good number to cover all those bases. Four meant that they had not built any ICBMs to speak of, nor would any ICBM survive a U.S. attack. They could be destroyed by a single U.S. plane with conventional explosives. How many of those of you who raised who remember the fallout interest in 1961 were conscious then or now that if nuclear war had come in 1961, it would not have started as a nuclear war by the Soviets? How many of you understood that what Kennedy was urging us to do was to protect ourselves from Russian retaliation to the U.S. first strike? Well, I can tell you, as somebody who worked on Berlin planning that year, Kennedy was not worrying that the Soviets would initiate nuclear war with their four ICBMs.

Q:

E: Yes. In vitraline. So -- you didn't know that. And I didn't know that, of course, as I say when I worked on the plan.

Q: Why was he pushing for these fallout shelters if he knew that the Russians only had four --

E: Because the Russians did have submarines, in fact, and it's calculated, as Fred Kaplan says in the thing, it was calculated

that you might miss one or two submarines. With Cruise missiles aboard, by the way. They had Cruise missiles -- so did we -- the cruder sort than the current ones, at that time, at sea. And if we had attacked first, a few Russian warheads might have gone through. Fallout shelters do work against^a retaliatory attack, if it's small enough, and that would have been relatively small. A few bombs. So that people very far from the area -- not, of course, under the area -- where the bomb came -- if you're far enough from it, a fallout shelter would, in fact, make a difference. And so it's a much more rational program than people realized. In fact, that's true to this day, let me say. It's no longer true that a second strike by the Soviets' retaliatory strike would fail to annihilate us. That's the difference. Because we backed the Russians down in 1961 with the Berlin crisis, because they backed down again over Cuba the next year when they had ten operational missiles instead of four, the Soviets fired Khrushchev and got Brezhnev, who promised to build them up where they wouldn't have to back down again. And they spent over a trillion dollars, as we spent in a comparable period, and poured a lot of concrete around a lot of missiles, and put a lot of submarines out to sea, and made it certain that if we struck them first, we would be essentially annihilated even with fallout shelters. However, it remains true that the plans for evacuation and civil defense that you hear about are not quite as crazy as people make them out to be, when they make jokes

about 15 minutes' warning. These are not plans to be used if our radar tells us that the Russian missiles are on the way. They are plans to "strengthen the President's hand in a severe crisis," well before the war is expected, by putting people out of harm's way in fallout shelters outside the cities, and threatening the Soviets that we are prepared to strike first, and that our fallout shelters need only protect us against their second strike. That is what the civil defense plans are. Those are subject to criticism also. But it's not quite the same. It's a different context from the one that most people imagine. They are not related to a no warning attack.

Q: Has anyone ever contemplated asking the civilian population to make that kind of exodus -- I mean, _____

DE: They have imagined it. If Reagan has his way, if his people have their way, the American people will exercise this, so that the President's hand can be strengthened. First time will be a great fuck-up, and the second time, and the third time, but eventually, we'll get to a point where people are quite used to moving out. As a matter of fact, in Germany and in Japan, in Japan, after the destruction of Tokyo, I've just read this the other day, many people got in the habit simply of moving out to the countryside at night. They just left Tokyo at night. Every night. There were a lot of people left in Tokyo, despite the destruction, which I'll describe next time. And the other big cities. Most of the cities of

Japan they just left, and went out in the fields, essentially. Well, that's a way you can learn to live, and this is a way that Reagan thinks would strengthen the President's hand, as it would.

Q: _____ the Pentagon planners who had come up with the essential first strike plan -- did they all understand how limited the Soviet capability was?

DE: No. Good question. And, no more than I did, of course. Quite the contrary -- they assumed the Soviets had a very big capability.

Q: So all of this developed out of some fear of a lethal threat.

DE: No. On the part of the people doing the planning, at my level, which was a high level, sort of colonel level, brigadier general level, and lower, the people doing those plans thought they were up against a very, very formidable enemy. That's what I thought I was facing. I, as somebody who at fourteen was very upset by this one thing my country did, and that was Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nevertheless found myself doing nuclear planning later in a situation where I understood that the best thing I could do as a human to reduce the chance of nuclear war in the world was to reduce the chance that the Soviets would be tempted to launch a deliberate surprise attack on our vulnerable _____
_____. So I was working night and day on something that seemed of the greatest urgency, starting in '58, and oriented toward the time several years in the future, '60 or '61, when the Soviets would acquire the predicted 500 to 1500, the Air Force was predicting 6000 Soviet missiles, eventually. But they did expect

three to five hundred by '61, instead of four. So most of the people in the system, then, whether they were as against nuclear weapons as I was or not, whether they were or not, found it the most obligatory thing in the world to do. They all felt very patriotic and very valuable and contributing to the safety of their own homeland and so forth. What is clear now is that the people of the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew throughout that period. That's another matter, but I'll just insert that. The people at the top knew that there were no Russian missiles, essentially. What that meant was that the plan I had worked on myself in '59, '60, '61, was nothing but a first strike plan in the eyes of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Several interesting aspects to this for the future. The ability of them to fool me, with my top secret clearance, and many, many other people, into thinking we were working on something quite different. I, at least, and I know I was not alone, would absolutely never have touched anything to do with the first strike plan. Lies, then, about the nature of the planning, or the nature of the enemy situation, contributed to recruiting me, and mobilizing me. On the other hand, I was a little surprised that the President didn't get more excited than he did, when I revealed to him the first strike contingency plan. There's a story in the Kaplan piece at which you might look in the Boston Globe which in fact I totally set him onto, but he then did interviews that I'm not in a position to do any more and

some, at least

these

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he tracked it down a great deal and it's in his book, The Wizards of Armageddon in some detail. I had learned about it from Mark Raskin of the Institute for Policy Studies, who was then working for McGeorge Bundy, that civilians, including Carl Kasan here at MIT now, the deputy to McGeorge Bundy, had called for a clever first strike plan in connection with Berlin -- not the kind that the Joint Chiefs would dream up, but something that would really use civilian sophistication, would exploit surprise, not be a massive brute force attack which would signal its coming to the Russian radar, but would do it right, fly under the radar, individual plane penetrations, complicated routes, and all that, that would get the job done with a maximum of surprise and catch the enemy unalert, and we'd knock them out. This was actually done, I learned after Kaplan had done his interviewing, by my closest friend. I thought I read everything over his desk in the Pentagon. Harry Rowan, later president of Rand. He was my closest friend. I thought, in fact, we shared totally the same repugnance to the idea of first use of nuclear weapons. I would have bet my life on that. And when I heard about this plan from Mark Raskin, Mark said that when he'd read it as a deputy under Kasan in '61, that he had cried, raged to McGeorge Bundy and to Kasan, said, "This is a Nazi plan. This is a plan for genocide." And never spoke to Kasan again. He left the White House. My reaction probably would have been very similar. But when he told me who

had done this plan, he said he had a feeling that Harry Rowan had somehow been involved, was on the list for distribution. I said, "That's impossible. No. Not Harry. Couldn't have been Harry." And he mentioned some other people, and I could sort of imagine the others doing this as an exercise. But Harry would not touch such a plan any more than I would have. Harry knew me, I knew he knew my views on this. So, it turns out, he didn't tell me that he had thought up that plan. Actually, Kasan had asked him for it, and he did the planning with Kasan, who was my tutor at Harvard, by the way, and read my honors thesis. And the President had spent only 45 minutes on this plan, but if you know Washington, that's a hell of a lot of time for the President. There were things I'd tried for years to get in front of the President and never succeeded. So Harry had known better than to tell me such a plan existed. This was my -- I've learned since of more things about the nature of the secrecy system. But I can tell you as a human being with some experience of different kinds in the world, I would have said, that this was a human being that I knew well enough, that couldn't have done that at all; if he had done it, I would have known about it, and somehow _____, no, no, I was with him all during that period. Now that may sound strange to you, but by itself that is no longer strange to me. Because the essence of the secrecy system is to lie to other people about what you

know and what you don't know. If you're not prepared to do that, you can't keep real secrets. If somebody says, do you know anything about this, x or y, if you're not prepared to say, no, when in fact you've just read a secret document higher than top secret, then to hesitate, to say, I can't say, any other answer, will suggest that there is another piece of paper which you're privy to, and then the person will try to get it. So that kind of lying does go on all the time. As usual, I knew that Harry lied to our other friends, as he was supposed to do, as was his job to do, about the existence of clearances higher than top secret. Congress had always been told under oath that there are no clearances higher than top secret. They have top secret clearance, that's all there is. The Senators do. I had twelve clearances higher than top secret. In fact, I recall once being over at the White House in Kasan's office, when Carl Kasan, _____, and somebody else were having this conversation. One said, could there be clearances that none of us know anything about. And Kasan said, who worked for Bundy who worked for the President, I have all the clearances. And nobody commented, because we each knew in that room, we all had enough clearances to know, anybody dumb enough to say that should not be disabused, because he apparently had just not gotten the picture. If you understood the system, you understood that there was no way in the world to know whether

you had all the clearances. For anybody. The way that they're generated, the way they're operated, one realizes, and when you realize how well the people you know who have risen in the system at this point and have lived with it, can fool you about this, and how you can fool other people. You should know that there is no possible way of knowing. There's no meaning to the statement, all the clearances, that's a foolish statement. He apparently had not gotten this simple aspect of what he was dealing with. I knew all this. I had the twelve clearances. I had to sign them away when I went to Vietnam in '65, because no one with any one of those clearances operative was allowed to go into the field, to go to Vietnam, and moreover, I was supposed to sign in in Saigon the fact that I had had these clearances, though I'd signed away, I'd debriefed, I was no longer -- forget the material when I got to Saigon. But a colonel warned me that if I followed the rules and informed the Saigon people that I had had these clearances, that I could then not go out of Saigon except in an "armed convoy or a four-engined plane." And I'd be stuck in Saigon the entire time, which was not why I was going to Vietnam. So I disobeyed that rule. I was told, what you should do was not obey that rule. The fear was that you'd be captured and debriefed. Okay. I thought I knew the secrecy system until I read the Church report in about 1977 on assassinations. This is now four years after my trial had ended. I was not a naive person about the government at this point. Watergate was over. I was aware by this time the President

had tried to kill me and had done a number of bizarre operations against me, which had figured ~~a-great-deal~~ very much in Watergate. So I knew a good deal about how the government operated by this time, one would say. But I had a lot of surprises left in the Church report. First it turned out that every President I'd worked for had actively attempted, with success, to kill various heads of state or other officials in other countries. I hadn't happened to know that. That wasn't the worst thing I knew about them by this time, I knew all this other planning _____.

It was striking that I hadn't known that. I had a lot of discussions with Tom Schelling at Harvard here. I remember one in particular, and he was saying, Why should there be this prohibition against assassination? If you're willing to this and this and this, why shouldn't you be willing to assassinate? Well, you could think of various reasons why or why not. I don't think any of us had the inkling of how common, in fact, assassination planning was -- it was as common as planning for first use of nuclear weapons, which was every few years in terms of crisis. This other surprising thing was, that the man who had been in charge of operations against Cuba had been my boss in Vietnam, Edward Lansdale. He'd come right from running an operation called Operation Mongoose against Cuba, which was to overthrow Castro by any means after the Bay of Pigs. And in which assassination planning was very prominent. It was done under Bobby Kennedy, who I had worked for in the last year

of his life a great deal on Vietnam, up until the last weekend. And I was not aware that either of them had had any connection whatever with Cuba. Very striking to me, because I'd spent many drunken evenings with Lansdale in Saigon over the course of two years. He was drinking a lot, and would tell endless anecdotes about his CIA days and I really thought, a member of the team, he was an ex-CIA man, there were three or four other famous CIA agents in this team, which also had people from the state where I was _____

They would tell stories night after night about his adventures, and he never mentioned Cuba. This gave me a sense of how secret things could be, and I hadn't gotten it with my twelve clearances. I would have said that you couldn't keep secrets like that from somebody like me in this kind of personal association. I got from this Church assassination _____ two insights, one in the nature of the degree of secrecy that could be kept, even in an intimate personal level _____, and second, the reasons for that and the uses to which ~~the~~ it could be put. Because the other thing the Church committee brought out was that the U.S. government had deliberately consciously taken part in the total destruction of democracy in one of the few democratic countries in the world. Especially one of the few in the northern hemisphere: Chile. It was clearly the conscious belief -- what did I say? Western hemisphere. It was the belief of Nixon

and his advisers that democracy in Chile in any form was incompatible with U.S. interests in Chile after the election of Allende. We'll go into this later. This is the way I read the Church report. So I was learning late in my life, not so long ago, six years ago, that the government I'd worked for and with is now capable of this too. Not of inheriting a war as we thought we had done in Vietnam. Not preparing to retaliate, let's say, to an enemy attack. We were preparing to institute a system of torture, detention camps, assassinations on a mass scale, taking apart, brick by brick, the institutions of democratic regime -- unions, independent newspapers, independent churches, everything, smashed, by U.S. design. One could see why they would need secrecy for that, or at least, something of a flattery, but it also turned out that they got the secrecy that they needed, which meant that humans, of the type I'd worked with, including some of the people I had worked with, kept secrets about that very well. And the job got done. In short, it's late in my life, relatively, though it started some 25 years ago, that I began learning things about my government that were very, very painful. At the same time, which seemed to hold lessons for the future, to explain something about where we are and where we might be going, what our current risks are, and also to pose very interesting and very important questions. As for Vietnam, of course, it was in 1965 that we began the bombing of Vietnam, actually we began in '64, the

Tonken Gulf incident, and then the steady bombing of Vietnam began in early '65, and it was a time, it was begun under the notion that it was something, as McNamara put it, you could stop. We had to be doing something, he said, to the North Vietnamese that they wanted us to stop, and which we could stop if they did what we wanted, which was to take their troops out of the southern part of Vietnam, and essentially let our appointed, chosen South Vietnamese leaders rule the country unchallenged. When McNaughton, my boss from Harvard Law School, would say to him he didn't think this would work, McNamara would say, what's your alternative? A language I was very used to from Rand, a language of rational choice, option, alternative, calculations, likelihoods, utilities, and McNamara was very comfortable with-th in that language from his time at the Harvard Business School. It turned out to be not such a smart alternative, such a smart question as he thought it was at the time, because a lot of things would have been better than what he started, the Rolling Thunder campaign, the only alternative he could think of, which proved not be so easy to stop. He started trying to stop it three years later. We had dropped one and a half million tons of bomb. As much as we'd dropped in all of Europe in World War II. When he started to stop it, he was removed. He was stopped. He was sent to the World Bank. But still at that time it was thought that since the Tet Offensive happened to coincide with his departure and thus a date where the American public

as a whole switched against the war and came to see it as useless, stalemated, unnecessary, hopeless, it was assumed that whoever was in power would end the war quickly, and the fact that the bombing had stopped, essentially, in March of 1968, when the President announced that he would not bomb above a certain line in North Vietnam, and we would not be in the race. Remember that? Actually, Clark Clifford and Paul Warnke, of the freeze movement now, dropped 1.7 million tons of bombs in the remaining 10 months of 1968. Paul Warnke dropped as many bombs in the last 10 months of 1968 as McNamara had dropped in the previous three years. That got the total to 3.2 million tons of bombs. World War II in all, we had dropped 2 million tons. So this was one and a half World War II. As I say, in March of '68, the American people turned against the War by a majority and that majority steadily increased from then on. By 1970 a majority of people felt the war was immoral, and that it had been a mistake ever to get into it. But as of '68, the war had 7 years to go. There was a saying in Washington then: There are only three people in this town who still believe in this war. Walt Wosthow (?) of MIT, Dean Rusk, and Lyndon Johnson. And that wasn't any kind of a joke, that was all any kind of a joke, that was all anyone could think of. No-one was able to name anyone else who believed in the war. But the war went on. After McNamara left, we dropped 6 million more tons of bombs. Three more World War IIs, four times as many bombs

as he had dropped in the preceding three years up to the Tet Offensive. That went on for seven years, being dropped by people who did not believe the war should continue. Who believed, as I did, that the war should stop. When I took an act in late '69 that I thought might help shorten the war, at the risk, as I thought, at the cost of going to jail for the rest of my life, I assumed, I really thought I was doing something whose object was agreed to by nearly everybody in the U.S. government. And by the way, as far as I know, that was true. I've never really learned, but I felt more strongly about this than thousands of people in the U.S. government, many of whom could have done what I did. But, as I say, the war went on. So this gave me another puzzle to wonder about, something we'll be looking at in this course. By this time, I was no longer confident that we had no lessons to learn from the Germans. I recall one moment in 1971, after Fulbright had failed to put out the Pentagon papers, when my wife, whom I married in 1970, told me that, was pressing me as to whether it really still made sense to put these out and go to jail. After all, it was only history. As Fulbright had said. That was his reason for not putting them out. She said, if Fulbright doesn't believe in them, why are you so sure this will make a difference? So I said, Well, he hasn't read them. He's read a little bit, but he hasn't really read them. I'm the only person who has read them, and I've got to go on my judgment. And I kept her from

reading them because I didn't want her to be implicated, I didn't want her fingerprints on them, when I was tried. But she was doubtful whether it could possibly be worthwhile at this point since others didn't really believe it. I said, okay, maybe it's time you have to read some of these. Actually, I'd said to her earlier, my real reasons for wanting to put them out. I said, I have no doubt that these documents, which were the history of U.S. decision making in Vietnam, from 1945 to 1968, and 1968 because the writers of the study believed the war was over in '68, as most people did. They were wrong by 7 years. So now, 3 years later, 2 invasions later, Laos and Cambodia, we were contemplating putting them out. And I said, Look, when I look at these documents, I'm sure that documents like this existed in Egypt under the Pharaohs, in Assyria in particular, imperialist Assyria, but nobody's gotten them.-- Rome, Greece, all the empires in the past. Only on one occasion has a clique been exposed to ~~this~~^{this} nature of thinking of imperial decision making. When the Russians overran Hitler's ~~command~~- advance command post in East Germany and captured what became the Nuremberg documents, which I read. It's the only time people have ever seen how this operation works. But we discounted those, we didn't learn from them, because they were German. All we learned was, this is how Germans make war. I've read the Nuremberg documents, and I've read these, and they read the same. They look the same, they feel the same. They are the same. I'm talking now not about the annihilation of the Jews, but about the

other things for which Hitler was to be criticized -- the invasions, blackmail, interments of East and West Europe. That looks very much like our planning in Vietnam. And I said, so this will give the people of the world two points on this graph to understand how their governments deal with their lives and other peoples' lives. That's very important. It's worth my life to put that out. Now, months had passed, it was time for her to see the stuff. So I gave her stuff from the very period I'd been in the Pentagon, '64-65, as an official. I'd gone in now, not as a consultant any more but as a highest-level civil servant, ^{CS-18} PSAT, that's equivalent to a lieutenant general. This was the year of escalation in Vietnam. So she went off and read them for several hours. And when she came back into the room, she was holding them and she was crying. And the part I'd given her was the part about the escalation, the plans for escalating against Vietnam which were filled with phrases like, the water drip technique, or the on-off technique. This was referring to the idea that it would be more effective if you bombed and then stopped for a while, let people get used to the pause, and then went back again. This was the recommendation to Henry Kissinger of Harvard by Ernest May, who's a consultant, now, close to the time, has been Chairman of Kennedy School, that the most effective way to do the bombing would be on-off, as shown by examples against --

Q : Kissinger was at Harvard then?

DE: No, Kissinger was then in the government.

Q: No but you're talking about you're papers _____
 _____ in '71 was '68.

DE: No, you're right, thank you for tracking very closely. I'm saying this technique was not invented by May. When Kissinger went to government in '69, May then wrote the memo to him from Harvard, in which he recommended that he pursue this ~~technique~~ tactic when the bombing was renewed. And it was done that way in the form of "defensive reaction raids." Raids that were rationalized as being reactions to defenses. But it had been started earlier actually by William Bundy and others. Water-drip technique, on-off, the ratchet effect, bit by bit raising the level of pain, "reaching the threshold of pain" of the people. And my wife came into the room and as I say she was crying, and she said, this is the language of torturers. And that was a moment of _____ to me, because it had not ever penetrated me that what I had been involved in as a critic, because I was against the bombing of Vietnam, though not against our involvement -- sort of like being for the Marines in Lebanon but not for the naval gunfire. You can laugh today at that idea. But I was against the bombing. But I was part of the system that was doing the bombing. I'd read all those memos at the time, and that word had never come through. In fact, I gave a lecture on coercive strategy at an institution in New York with a lot of Harvard professors at it, and _____, and we sat around a table like this in

1970, and I gave this paper on coercive diplomacy, I called it. And I said, I haven't thought of a good word for a process in which you try to coerce somebody not just with verbal threats, but with the actual infliction of destruction. I was talking about the bombing of Vietnam. I couldn't think of a word. Noone around the table came up with the word. I thought about that for a while, what do you call it, how do you distinguish ^{something} like the Cuban missile crisis where no shots are actually fired from a situation where the shots are actually fired, but you're still trying to coerce. There was a little conceptual problem. And none of us, not only me, managed to perceive that what I had been part of was what I had sworn to myself I would never, never, never be part of. Torture of an entire population. She is the first woman to have read the Pentagon papers, aside from secretaries who had typed them. The first woman who had ever seen any of those documents. I remember asking McNaughton once, my boss, what does your wife think about what we're doing. And he said, this in 1965, he said, she thinks we're crazy. End of that conversation. In fact, most of these people, McNamara's wife got an ulcer during these days, son left him, wouldn't speak to him for many years, I don't know if they ever patched it up. In any case, there was a male dimension to this decision making. But what it ends up to, finally, and I'll be closing now, is a journey of discover for me, which as you can imagine, is extremely painful discoveries, about

people I worked with, about who I was, how had I managed to be blind for so long, who are these guys after all that I was working with, these secretive fellows. But what were they really like? They were clearly tough, in ways that I had not quite imagined when I heard Kennedy use the word tough, which was one of his most common words. It was a tough administration, tough-minded people like McGeorge Bundy. Tough-minded, a very good William James word. I don't think we'd really picked up the notion that tough in that sense meant a willingness to participate in killing any official or head of state who got in our way, or threatening and preparing the initiation of nuclear war, or the destruction of democracy in countries in our hemisphere. It's a kind of toughness that I hadn't imagined. And at the same time it raised questions that we'll try to deal with. [END OF SIDE]

Q: What was imperceptibly or subtly distinguished between what people like your people in government do, so that the phenomenon of compliance with an institutional plan, the going along for the sake of one's funding, or one's career, or one's progress, not really speaking the truth because -- making that 80% or 40% fudge with the truth for some socio-political constraint of your environment, because you don't want to offend some party, that's something that I recognize, that goes on every day of my life, I know, and I probably stick my neck out more than average.

DE: Does that sound familiar to anybody else?

Q: It strikes me that that's the way that we all have secrets, and

secret clearances, and are unsure about _____

: Before we talk too much about them, let's stick to us, and my thinking through what you were saying is we are them, or them is us, there isn't a distinction _____ coming to. It's very easy to think that government is something totally different from me. Those people are entirely different _____ who are these people. I'm going to be scared to find out, but I think it's true they are us.

DE: Anybody suspect otherwise? That they really are different.

Q: There's something about -- struck all evening as you're talking about secrets, about this sort of double meaningness, like there's this sinister, machiavellian thing and then there's the exciting, you talk about the secret key. Something so exciting and repugnant about the _____ any different between them and me, it's that they know something that I don't know, and they weren't afraid to find out about it. There's something different about how much _____ know.

DE: Well, of course, the knowledge that they know more than you do is not secret. In a way you're meant to know, these people know things you don't know. You don't know what they are. But it's a major factor in inducing acceptance, a legitimacy of their authority, your dependence on them. They've got to decide. Who else can? We

don't have the information. Simul (?) speaks of secret as an
 adornment in that sense. A badge of status. When Henry Kissinger
 and was?
 was new in Washington with his famous, as they say in the newspapers
 for going to dinner parties with an envelope under his arm, which
 he had to keep hold of during the entire dinner party and couldn't
 let go, couldn't put it down _____ with
 red lining on the outside and so forth. To make it fairly clear
 that he was the bearer, you know, ~~that~~ of information which he was
 not allowed to share with them. Very familiar to anybody who has
 been around. But at the same time, it's kind of a conversation
 stopper, in the sense that, so anyone would be tempted to argue
 with him, the answer is, if you knew what I knew, you would agree
 with me. I might say, by the way, in line of what you're saying,
 not to keep you in suspense as to what would go into it, on my
 own thinking on the answer to some of these questions as to who
 are these guys has changed a lot in the last few months, after
 all this time, because of what I regard as quite mind-blowing
 material by _____ Herb Kellman, who I spent a couple of hours
 with this afternoon, who had some papers, I'm having a couple of
 them reproduced and I'll give them out on Wednesday, on
 reactions to the Calley trial and a marvellous paper called "Violence
 Without Moral Restraint." I think it's a really exceptional paper.
 They, in turn, tie into something I've thought about for a long
 time -- do you know the work of Stanley Milgram (?) on _____

_____? Well, Milgram deals with how it is that people come to obey what look like very destructive orders. But he doesn't deal at all with the psychology of people who give the orders and in fact his conjecture in the book is that they have a very different psychology. This was my conjecture too. So that for me to learn that my friends had in fact known what they were doing in planning like this, meant to me until quite recently, that they must have been very different from what I thought. In fact, that's the way Milgram interpreted it. They said, well, if you're saying that the President knew, you know in Baker's sense, what did the President know, that the President was witting, that the President knew about this sort of thing, then you're saying what Reagan is saying, when Reagan implied in his first statements about the Korean Air shoot-down, that Andropov or the high leaders knew it was a civilian airliner. And they shot it down. In other words, he's saying that this reveals them to be totally blood-thirsty, " uncivilized" in their use of these very sophisticated products of civilization _____

Kellman's point is very persuasive and there is evidence for it, that people at the top manage to feel very much like the subordinates, actually, that they feel that they too have no choice but to do what they're doing. And that they're not fully responsible for what they're doing, they shouldn't be held fully accountable -- they have a job to do, just like the sweeper at the other

end. They're only giving orders. Milgram himself -- and I spent about 10 hours with him last week, going over this stuff -- and Milgram himself was saying, You're saying the President knew about the destruction of 2 million people in Indonesia? Which I do say. And he says, well, then you're saying that he was wholly evil, and he's a different order or being -- I just can't believe that he was that different. And I had to point out to him, you're making the same criticism of that hypothesis that critics of your work make of the behavior of subordinates. That they couldn't be giving these electric shocks unless they were evil people. And they couldn't be that evil. So the results couldn't be what you say. Or if they are what you say, you are saying that Americans are as evil as Germans, and we know how evil they were. He agreed, that was a problem. In other words, I am newly coming, thanks to Kellman and others to the assumption that these people aren't so different from most people. That that's not wholly reassuring -- it means that there's a big supply in all available political parties of people who will do this job and who will give these orders, as well as, Milton shows us in Vietnam shows us, and a limited supply of people who will carry out the orders. So what do we do about this?

Q: I just want to pursue this a little bit, because I felt, when I heard you at Rounds (?) in February, I remember being so distressed by your walking us through point-by-point some of the details of

the development of the policies for the massacre in the World War II bombing. I found that glaring (?) and as if you were putting down almost sheaf by sheaf a layering of consciousness as we were moving through this notion of the project of civilization -- that's why I found your comment at the end of this so devastating once again. I remember, for example, the exact preoccupation of all of the details of how much they could bring of fire bombing, magnifying that, and the images you read to us from the Time Magazine of the --

DE: Well, I was going to talk about that on Wednesday.

Q: I have to get rid of the image -- of Tokyo burning like autumn leaves. And -- I don't know what I'm looking for in the course but it's something about the project of technology and death and civilization. Again, I flashed back to Galway Kinnell's remark, it was part of his poem at commencement, I don't know if any of you were there when he read that, about the end, the project of technological civilization was to do away with death once and for all by killing all mortal beings who die. Now, somewhere --

Q: That's a final solution, all right.

Q: Yeah, it is.

DE: It would be hard to disprove that one, in the sense, if you were a Martian behaviorist, you see, who didn't put too much truck in subjective data, and just looked at what these people were up to, right? And is it purposive? That's the thing, of course, pointed to by Powers ~~-you-look~~ point of view. You look over a process, you look at a process of 30 years and say, here was a

job to be done, are they setting out to achieve it? They're setting out to exterminate themselves.

Q: Yeah, but that goes ~~against~~ -- I mean, Job was ahead of that kind
(defined?)
of thinking, I mean, retrospectively to find purpose in the
conventional sense of motivated behavior I think is going to get
us all --

DE: Well, I believe there's conflict here. In other words, that this
is not an unambivalent drive toward annihilation. I don't believe,
in other words, that we are fated to exterminate ourselves.

Q: I find that unsatisfactory -- the notion of a kind of motivated
extermination.

DE: No, I'm agreeing. You hear that --

Q: It looks like it, but I think that the answers, and God knows I
don't have them, I don't think it's going to lie there, in the
intention to do evil, I think that isn't going to be as helpful
as one might at first blush think.

DE: Well, no, but do you understand, that's not my interpretation --

Q: No, nor was I saying that --

Q: But you are saying there is a somehow purposeful moving toward the
destruction -- getting rid of death.

DE: All right, let me explain what I can see, I won't speak for you,
I'll just say on my side, I said, it looks that way, which is to
say, that's a statement about the way things are going. I think
it is a fair statement to say, it's a descriptive statement about
the situation. It looks as if, if you just looked at this, you

might think it was what they were up to. I have a phrase by John McNaughton in my mind. When we were preparing a chart for McNamara to use for a briefing on television about the state of pacification in Vietnam, and John was about 6 foot 6 or so, and this chart was a very tall chart to be used, he was looking at it _____ height, and McNamara -- it was to stand next to McNamara and it was a chart of Vietnam, a map of Vietnam, with Viet Cong controlled portions in red, and Saigon controlled portions in white. And, he looked at it, he said, We're going to have to do something about that chart, because if you stand in front of this chart and blink your eyes rapidly, it's a red chart. I'm saying if you sort of blink your eyes as you look at the world, you're looking at a self-destructive process -- ~~That's~~ going on. That's all I'm saying. We must do something about this.

Q: There aren't going to be too many upbeat notes to this.

DE: No, in fact there are. And I'll tell you, if I recall to you in fact, whether anybody can change, I could have left this to the end, but I didn't leave it in suspense. Andrea Elkovich, who as I say is in a hospital right now recovering from her fall, was a deputy sheriff. Was a well-respected deputy sheriff. She's changed about as much as the Catholic bishops have changed in the last year. And if Catholic bishops can change that much, then anybody can.

Q: Know who showed up to the Congress on Tuesday to testify on behalf of the impact of nuclear war on children and adolescents and he

would draw the line? The civil defense planner for the region of whatever in Virginia that he was from, and he said, when it changed from protecting people to planning for a nuclear war, I couldn't be a civil defense planner any more. He got up before the Congress on Tuesday, with his daughter, and addressed the Committee.

DE: Well, here's a thought. I'm going to be talking about -- this is right in line with that -- first I'll mention one other thing, why Andrea ended her fast. They didn't of course get any response from any states they had hoped for. But they had earlier defined their objectives as being to get a response from persons or institutions, like parties, as well as from states. And there was not much of that, either, in the United States or in France where people were fasting. But in Germany there was quite spectacular response. In fact, I tried to buy over here some copies, but somebody just bought them up of this week's Die Zeit, which is the major ~~journal~~- German weekly newspaper. Sort of like the News, and the _____ Review and the New York Times, but larger, sort of like the Sunday Times, which has a three-page feature on the fasters and the effect they had in Germany, which was quite important. And the effect was in particular on the leaders and the deputies of the Social Democratic Party, the opposition party, but Willi Brandt came to see Andrea and _____, two fasters, and I happened to be there that day. And he had come to urge them to stop their fast, and made some promises that he

would do even more than he had done in the past on a couple of issues that he had in fact spoken out on before, namely, he would back the freeze, and he would call for a transfer of resources from ~~civil~~ military to civilian uses. These had been put to him by some supporters of the fasters as conditions, maybe that he could make, promises that he could make. But this didn't deal with the Pershings and Cruise missiles. So he was asked whether, in front of the fasters, whether he would take a position now, right away, instead of next week, instead of at the end of the year, against the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles. Calling for a delay in the deployment. I was expecting the Social Democrats would call for such a delay. But they weren't going to do it until late November. After the big demonstrations scheduled for October. His first reaction was that that was not excluded, but very reserved about it. And after some discussion, he was convinced. And he said, you have the word of Willi Brandt. I agree to this. I will commit myself to it. And Andrea then said, looking like Camille, late in the day, said, will you put that in writing and sign it? And he hesitated a moment, and said, Well, yes. And afterwards I asked Andrea, did you mean to imply to him that you didn't trust his word, the word of Willi Brandt? And she said, I learned in the San Francisco Polict Department it doesn't exist.if it's not in writing. Well, two hours later, he sent over a messenger saying, I, after our discussion, assure you as follows: I will work now for the delay in the deployment, for the rejection. This

meant, essentially, a public split with Schmidt, which he had never made. Brandt is the head of the party, and in the Bundestag, Schmidt is in the Bundestag and is of course the former Chancellor. Schmidt last week, then, as a result of his meeting with the fasters, said on television, I have always been against the deployment of these. I have never said so publicly before because I did not want to undermine the position of the Chancellor. But the time has come now when we must say there must be a delay in the deployment and in fact I am against the deployment at all. Secondly,

Q: When did Schmidt say this?

DE: No, Schmidt said the opposite, and Schmidt is opposing him on this point. But the Southwest Regional conference of the party, the second largest regional conference, met a week ago, and reached an almost unanimous opinion, 500-1, that the missiles should not come to Europe, in other words, rejecting the dual track, rejecting the negotiations, whatever happened in Geneva, there should be no missiles coming over. Schmidt took this as a total repudiation of his former policy and denounced it. Brandt endorsed it. And so this was regarded in Die Zeit, Guy told me, as saying very very significant, that the Social Democrats had in fact now were splitting on this issue, moving left on the whole. The people in the Southwest Region included a number of deputies who had voted with Schmidt at every point up to this point and were now voting against him. This was now happening in September, rather than November, meaning that the demonstrations in October, October 15-22, will be sponsored by Social Democrats. Not all of them -- Schmidt

won't be at them, but Brandt will be at them. So, they will not just be green party demonstrations, they will not be extremist, or violent, or whatever, which is not Green, but they will be major, centrist demonstrations. They'll be much larger, even less violent, much more powerful than they would be and that starts working right now. Papers, by the way, over here have not given any of this, nothing of this, I've been watching the newspapers on that. This is all over the German newspapers. I don't read German, but they've been translated for me, and the German newspapers are taking this as a major event. It is totally caused -- the timing was totally caused by the fasters. And the fast simply had the effect that it was meant to have. They had found a way to dramatize the fact that all of our lives are in the hands of the leaders of the nuclear nations. Not just theirs. And that these coming weeks are critical for the arms race and for everybody. So they turned our attention on those immediate weeks, on doing something in September rather than October or rather in November when they will be dead, but in a larger sense, if nothing has happened to keep them alive, in the arms race, we're all, not dead, but we're all at sharply greater risk. So they had found a way to say, continue the arms race, if that's your choice, without any break, without any change in momentum, but you will have to do that over our bodies. You'll have to watch us die. And although it didn't -- there wasn't time enough, perhaps, or maybe it was impossible, it didn't affect directly the heads of state,

although by the way Cole paid a good deal of attention to this, he sent his ambassador to visit the faster, who promised them that they would continuously brief them on the negotiations. Anyway, because he didn't want a martyr for these demonstrations. But instead of a martyr, what he got was an endorser of the demonstrations. Willi Brandt, which he didn't need. So, if he was going to keep on his present course. So the risk that they took made a difference. And this -- oh, I know why I was going toward this, was I was talking to my wife on why the fasters in Oakland had decide to quit. Andrea, actually, wanted to go on. But she quit in the end in solidarity with the others. And, various things. Nobody was telling them to go on. The only people who talked to them told them to stop. They had the Korean airliner shoot-down which convinced them increasingly day by day that ~~their~~ not only were they bound to die if they went on, but their death would not help any movement over here. The mood was not such that their death would accomplish anything. And one other thing. As Pat said, every cell in their body was telling them to eat, as the days went on. And Pat said, that's my belief that what's going to happen to this world. That we're going to reach a point here, where like the cells in those fasters' bodies, every person on earth is going to begin to resonate with the call, we must change. We want peace. We want this threat to go down, to end. And Lancelot Lawell-White (?) made the point that everything in

our past history tells us as power tells us that we are on a trajectory toward annihilation. That's the way to bet, if you bet from past experience. But he said, but no generation will have ever been confronted, ever before, by this challenge. And since we're human, what cannot be ruled out by these theories based on the past, is that there will be a break in history because humand rise to this threat. To this challenge. And we are seeing that happen. They are rising. We can still regard it as a race between two trajectories, but still we have a chance and it's up to us. So, let's try to see if we can understand the world so as to -- I have to go on one last minute. I was driving with Roland _____ who joined the fast in an open-ended way as a Member of Parliament, Bundestag in Germany, just before coming back. And I asked him, what had made him decide to join the fast. And he told me that one thing had been ringing in his head, which was a line that came out of Rudy _____ funeral, did not come out earlier. Rudy _____ was shot, Red Rudy of 68, anarchist, a Marxist anarchist, was shot by an assassin, terrorist, in the brain and had epilepsy thereafter and lost his ability to speak or read or write. But he made an immense and unpredictable, unforeseeable effort to teach himself again to read. And he did this by reading with the help of his friends texts that he had read before he was shot. And he was going over Marx's theses on Feuerbach. And reached the phrase, philosophers of various kinds have hitherto only interpreted -- no, philosophers have hitherto interpreted the

world in various ways, but the point is, to change it. And in reading this, he'd made a slip, a Freudian slip, or as Roland told me, we have a phrase in Germany that means a Freudian correction. He said it right. And the friend had not told Rudy that he'd done this, and only mentioned it at his death. And what he'd heard Rudy say was, Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways, but the point is to change one's self. And I think, what it comes down to I think, one thing we'll at least explore, I think, _____ in changing the world we will change ourselves, and we have to do both.